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More than 60% of human infectious diseases are caused by pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals.
Zoonotic disease organisms include those that are endemic in human populations or enzootic in animal
populations with frequent cross-species transmission to people. Some of these diseases have only emerged
recently. Together, these organisms are responsible for a substantial burden of disease, with endemic and enzootic
zoonoses causing about a billion cases of illness in people and millions of deaths every year. Emerging zoonoses
are a growing threat to global health and have caused hundreds of billions of US dollars of economic damage in
the past 20 years. We aimed to review how zoonotic diseases result from natural pathogen ecology, and how other
circumstances, such as animal production, extraction of natural resources, and antimicrobial application change
the dynamics of disease exposure to human beings. In view of present anthropogenic trends, a more eﬀective
approach to zoonotic disease prevention and control will require a broad view of medicine that emphasises
evidence-based decision making and integrates ecological and evolutionary principles of animal, human, and
environmental factors. This broad view is essential for the successful development of policies and practices that
reduce probability of future zoonotic emergence, targeted surveillance and strategic prevention, and engagement
of partners outside the medical community to help improve health outcomes and reduce disease threats.

Introduction
Pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals
cause more than 60% of infectious diseases in man.1
Such pathogens and diseases include leptospirosis, cysticercosis and echinococcosis, toxoplasmosis, anthrax,
brucellosis, rabies, Q fever, Chagas disease, type A
inﬂuenzas, Rift Valley fever, severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), Ebola haemorrhagic fever, and the
original emergence of HIV.2–6 Zoonotic diseases
are often categorised according to their route of

transmission (eg, vector-borne or foodborne), pathogen
type (eg, microparasites, macroparasites, viruses, bacteria, protozoa, worms, ticks, or ﬂeas), or degree of
person-to-person transmissibility.7 The greatest burden
on human health and livelihoods, amounting to about
1 billion cases of illness and millions of deaths every
year, is caused by endemic zoonoses that are persistent
regional health problems around the world.2 Many of
these infections are enzootic (ie, stably established) in
animal populations, and transmit from animals to
people with little or no subsequent person-to-person
transmission—for example, rabies or trypanosomiasis.

Key messages
• Nearly two-thirds of human infectious diseases arise from pathogens shared with wild
or domestic animals
• Endemic and enzootic zoonoses cause about a billion cases of illness in people and
millions of deaths every year, and emerging zoonoses are a rising threat to global
health, having caused hundreds of billions of US dollars of economic damage in the
past 20 years
• Ecological and evolutionary perspectives can provide valuable insights into pathogen
ecology and can inform zoonotic disease-control programmes
• Anthropogenic practices, such as changes in land use and extractive industry actions,
animal production systems, and widespread antimicrobial applications aﬀect zoonotic
disease transmission
• Risks are not limited to low-income countries; as global trade and travel expands,
zoonoses are increasingly posing health concerns for the global medical community
• Ecological, evolutionary, social, economic, and epidemiological mechanisms aﬀecting
zoonoses’ persistence and emergence are not well understood; such information
could inform evidence-based policies, practices, and targeted zoonotic disease
surveillance, and prevention and control eﬀorts
• Multisectoral collaboration, including clinicians, public health scientists, ecologists
and disease ecologists, veterinarians, economists, and others is necessary for eﬀective
management of the causes and prevention of zoonotic diseases
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Search strategy and selection criteria
We selected high-quality references that showed rigorous
scientiﬁc methodologies in their research and analyses. We
searched Web of Science for reviews and research articles
published between Jan 1, 1990, and June 1, 2012, with the
search terms “zoonotic disease” and “antimicrobial
resistance”, and ﬁltered results for “animals”, “wildlife”, or
“wild animals”. We chieﬂy selected publications from the past
decade but did not exclude commonly referenced or highly
regarded older publications. We also searched reference lists of
articles identiﬁed by this search and selected those we judged
relevant. Review articles and book chapters are cited to
provide readers with more details and more references.
Non-peer-reviewed sources such as reports from the World
Organization for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture
Organization, and WHO were also reviewed to provide direct
information or additional supporting references. Additional
references and materials were suggested by anonymous
reviewers and additional reviewers invited by the authors.
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Other zoonotic pathogens can spread eﬃciently
between people once introduced from an animal
reservoir, leading to localised outbreaks (eg, Ebola
virus) or global spread (eg, pandemic inﬂuenza).
Zoonoses made up most of the emerging infectious
diseases identiﬁed in people in the past 70 years which,
although relatively rare compared with endemic
zoonoses, are a substantial threat to global health and
have caused economic damage exceeding hundreds of
billions of US dollars in the past 20 years.8,9 Apart from
the appearance of a pathogen for the ﬁrst time in
human beings, the distinction between endemic and
emerging zoonoses can be viewed as temporal or
geographical. An endemic disease in one location
would be regarded as an emerging disease if it crossed
from its natural reservoir and entered the human or
animal populations in a new geographical area, or if an
endemic pathogen evolved new traits that created an
epidemic (eg, drug resistance).
Transmission of pathogens into human populations
from other species is a natural product of our relation
with animals and the environment. The emergence of
zoonoses, both recent and historical, can be considered
as a logical consequence of pathogen ecology and
evolution, as microbes exploit new niches and adapt to
new hosts. The underlying causes that create or provide
access to these new niches seem to be mediated by
human action in most cases, and include changes in
land use, extraction of natural resources, animal production systems, modern transportation, antimicrobial
drug use, and global trade. Although underlying
ecological principles that shape how these pathogens
survive and change have remained similar, people have
changed the environment in which these principles
operate. Domestication of animals, clearing of land for
farming and grazing, and hunting of wildlife in new
habitats, have resulted in zoonotic human infection
with microorganisms that cause diseases such as rabies,
echinococcosis, and the progenitors of measles and
smallpox that had historically aﬀected only animal
populations through changes in contact and increased
transmission opportunities from animals to people.10–12
As human societies have developed, each era of livestock
revolution presented new health challenges and new
opportunities for emergence of zoonotic pathogens.13
In the past few decades, accelerating global changes
linked to an expanding global population have led to
the emergence of a striking number of newly described
zoonoses, including hantavirus pulmonary syndrome,
monkeypox, SARS, and simian immunodeﬁciency
virus (the animal precursor to HIV). Some of these
zoonoses, such as HIV, have become established as
substantial new human pathogens that circulate
persistently without repeat animal-to-person transmission. SARS could have established, but was
contained by rapid global response to its emergence;14
other zoonoses, such as Ebola virus and Nipah virus,
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012

Panel 1: Basic reproduction number (R0)
The ability of a pathogen to transmit in a population is
commonly quantiﬁed by the basic reproduction number
(R0), which can be described mathematically. Formally, R0 is
the average number of secondary cases an infected
individual can cause in a speciﬁc population in which all
individuals are susceptible. If R0 is greater than 1, the
number of cases caused by a pathogen will increase and
cause an epidemic. By contrast, when R0 is less than 1, the
number of cases will diminish and the pathogen will
eventually become extinct. For many pathogens, R0 is
correlated with density of susceptible hosts (and contacts
between them), thus one way that a new zoonosis can fail to
become endemic in people is if the human population is
sparse. This straightforward relation between population
density and the ability of new zoonoses to colonise people
might underpin the emergence of a series of endemic
diseases thousands of years ago (eg, the Egyptian plagues,
smallpox, and rubella), when populations aggregated into
towns or cities and thus reached the density at which R0 for
person-to-person transmission of pathogens introduced
from animals exceeded 1, or could exceed 1 by evolving
person-speciﬁc adaptations.16

have not become established because of local control
eﬀorts or their intrinsic inability to transmit eﬃciently
between people. However, others such as hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome, which is enzootic in rodents in
many locations, cause sporadic and infrequent clusters
of infections in human beings.15 In all cases, these
emerging zoonoses are deﬁned by their relatively recent
appearance (or detection) in a population or, in some
cases, an ampliﬁcation of transmission that increases
the incidence, prevalence, or geographical distribution
of previously rare pathogens.15
Emergence of a zoonosis depends on several factors
that often act simultaneously to change pathogen
dynamics. The capacity of a pathogen to transmit or
spread in a population is commonly quantiﬁed by the
basic reproduction number, or R0 (panel 1). In addition to
inherent properties of the pathogen, factors aﬀecting
emergence or spread include environmental factors or
changes in land use, human population growth, changes
to human behaviour or social structure, international
travel or trade, microbial adaptation to drug or vaccine
use or to new host species, and breakdown in public
health infrastructure.17 With more than a billion international travellers every year, infected individuals could
potentially spread zoonotic diseases anywhere in the
world. Thus, with the emergence of new infectious
diseases and the chronic presence of known zoonotic
diseases in many low-income and middle-income countries that might or might not be adequately diagnosed or
reported, zoonoses are increasingly relevant to the global
medical community.
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Ecology of zoonoses: why pathogens do what
they do
Understanding infectious diseases beyond the scale of
individual clinical cases requires assessment of ecological and evolutionary perspectives. An epidemic is
fundamentally an interaction between populations of
two species, pathogen and host, and hence has formal
similarities to predator–prey and other consumer–resource systems that ecologists have studied for decades.
Multiyear cycles of immunising diseases such as
measles have been understood by direct analogy to
predator–prey cycles, and are driven by alternating
periods of predator population growth (when prey are
abundant) and decline (when prey are depleted).18 Similarly, interactions between pathogen strains can be
understood through assessment of principles of ecological competition: one recent study19 explained the
striking diversity of pneumococcal serotypes, and the
epidemiological eﬀect of the polyvalent conjugate vaccine, by interpretation of components of the acquired
immune response in terms of stabilising and ﬁtnessequalising ecological mechanisms. Such parallels are
intrinsic and pervade all aspects of infectious disease—
even the central epidemiological concept of R0 is borrowed from population ecology.20 Similarities apply to
both macroparasites (helminths and arthropod ectoparasites) and microparasites (viruses, bacteria, and
protozoa). One diﬀerence is that microparasites have
short generation times and can be subject to strong
selection pressures from host immunity, other organisms present in the microbiome, and antimicrobial
drugs, all of which are key potential components of the
ecosystem in which the microbes live. As a result,
pathogen evolution can occur in very short timescales;21,22 signiﬁcant evolutionary changes can occur in
the course of one epidemic or even during individual
infections. A conspicuous example is the development
of resistance in bacteria in response to antimicrobial
therapy and, in a slightly longer timescale, the antigenic
change in inﬂuenza viruses that results in the need
for frequent updating of the inﬂuenza vaccine
formulation.23
The dynamics of zoonotic disease transmission are
deeply embedded in the ecology and evolutionary
biology of their hosts. A zoonosis comprises interaction
between at least three species: one pathogen and two
host species, with people and another animal species
acting as the reservoir of the infection. For vector-borne
zoonoses,24 the ecology is complicated because the
ecology of numerous other vector and reservoir host
species can change transmission dynamics.24 Directly
transmitted zoonoses can also have several reservoir
hosts, potentially serving diﬀerent roles in pathogen
dynamics, such as ampliﬁcation or transmission to
human beings.25 For example, the zoonotic paramyxovirus Nipah virus has fruit bat reservoir hosts in
Malaysia. The virus became established in domestic pig
1938

populations, amplifying viral transmission and leading
to a large outbreak in human beings in 1998–99.26 More
than 100 people died during this outbreak and more
than 1 million pigs were killed to control the disease.
Changes in abundance of animal hosts can strikingly
aﬀect disease incidence in people. A decrease in the
abundance of a preferred animal host can cause an
arthropod vector to shift feeding patterns to human
beings, leading to a disease outbreak. For example,
when rinderpest was ﬁrst introduced to east Africa,
cattle and wildebeest populations depleted rapidly and
tsetse ﬂies switched to feeding on people, causing a
large epidemic of sleeping sickness.27 Environmental
changes (including anthropogenic eﬀects) might
change the abundance of a wildlife reservoir host,
increasing transmission within the reservoir and the
risk of zoonotic transmission. El Niño events in
1991–92 and 1997–98 led to human hantavirus cases in
the southwestern USA via an ecological cascade:
increased precipitation caused vegetation growth,
allowing rodent densities to rise, allowing an increase
in hantavirus infections in rodents. This increase did
not cause population declines in rodents because, like
many wildlife reservoirs of zoonotic pathogens, hantavirus causes mild or subclinical infections in this
group. However, the increased prevalence in rodents
increased the risk of infection in people.28
Ecological principles also apply at the scale of individuals. Infected hosts contain a population of pathogens
that grows and evolves according to the same principles
as a free-living plant or animal population. Processes of
viral replication, immune clearance, and tissue tropism
can be understood by analogy to ecological processes of
reproduction, mortality, and dispersal between habitats.29,30 The microbial ecology of zoonotic pathogens
within their reservoir hosts can be a key determinant of
risk to human health. For example, feeding diﬀerent
diets to beef cattle before slaughter leads to diﬀerent
environmental conditions within the gut, and a shift in
the balance of competition among microbial species,
which can change the abundance of human pathogens
such as Escherichia coli O157:H7.31 The ecological principle of competitive exclusion is the basis for common
approaches to control of zoonotic pathogens in livestock
and poultry.32,33
Meta-genomic studies show that the community of
commensal bacteria within healthy hosts plays an important part in defence against pathogens.34 Furthermore, disruption of this community through changes
in diet or use of antimicrobials can allow the growth of
other organisms, some of which might be pathogenic.
This mechanism underlies diﬀerential susceptibility to
Clostridium diﬃcile infection and might also increase
the risk of zoonotic infections (as reported for salmonella).35,36 This factor underscores the importance of
study of the full microbial community within hosts
(microbiome), and not just pathogens.34
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012

Series

Zoonotic disease risk and global demand for food
Increasing demand for food due to an expanding
global population has led to a substantial susceptibility
of our populations to food-borne zoonoses.37 Pathogens
in the livestock production chain are a particular
risk, with repeated outbreaks from meat, eggs, milk,
and cheese, or meat byproducts incorporated into
foods as ﬂavouring, oils, or stock.38 Globally, most
types of domesticated and wild vertebrates and
many invertebrates are foods for people; such foods are
capable of harbouring zoonotic bacteria, viruses, or
parasites.38
Knowledge of the ecology of many foodborne pathogens and their range of hosts is poor. When disease
outbreaks occur in people, the animal source is often
diﬃcult to identify, restricting epidemiological investigation and ecological understanding. As for many
zoonoses, foodborne pathogens often cause mild or
subclinical disease in reservoir hosts, and because
surveillance systems for wildlife and domestic animals
are not universally adequate for detection of clinical
disease or pathogen presence, humans beings often act
as sentinel populations for zoonoses.39
The volume of consumption of wildlife products for
food is at least an order of magnitude lower than it is
for domestic livestock.40 However, human being–animal
contact associated with hunting, preparation, and
consumption of wild animals has led to transmission of
notable diseases. Such diseases include HIV/AIDS,
which was linked to the butchering of hunted chimpanzees,41 SARS, which emerged in wildlife market and
restaurant workers in southern China,42 and Ebola
haemorrhagic fever linked to the hunting or handling
of infected great apes or other wild animals.43 All these
disease transmissions are examples of organisms or
pathogens exploiting new host opportunities resulting
from human behaviour. For central African countries
alone, estimates of annual wild meat consumption total
1 billion kg.4 Solutions to increased demand for bushmeat are not straightforward, and although substitution
of protein from domestic animal production might
seem logical, increased livestock production in developing countries without adequate disease-management
practices might lead to the emergence of other pathogens due to the introduction of new hosts.
Many foodborne zoonoses are enzootic in livestock
(eg, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, salmonellosis, and
some helminth infections), especially in low-income
and middle-income countries, and result in endemic
infections and outbreaks of disease in people. Cultural
and farming practices such as stocking rates, mixing of
species, methods of conﬁnement, and feeding, and lack
of proper implementation of disease-control methods—
because of weak veterinary infrastructures and insufﬁcient public–private partnerships to support and
strengthen them—can serve to maintain or spread
zoonotic diseases in livestock and provide a source of
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012

new infections in susceptible human populations
(panel 2).45,46 The techniques with which animals are
slaughtered and processed, and how products are
stored, packed, transported, and prepared at the place
they are consumed, also enable foodborne disease
outbreaks.37 Outbreaks of trichinosis in people are often
linked to the consumption of incompletely cooked meat
from pigs and wild boars and, occasionally, wild game.37
Cysticercosis (caused by the pig tapeworm Taenia
solium) aﬀects 50 million people every year.2
Echinococcosis (caused by the larval stages of the dog
tapeworm Echinococcus granulosus for which ungulates
serve as the intermediate host) aﬀects 200 000 people
every year, resulting in relative economic impacts
equivalent to US$4·1 billion annually for treatment and
control in humans and animals.6 Other notable
foodborne parasites include trematodes (liver, lung,
and intestinal ﬂukes), which are a neglected disease
group despite contributing to a substantial disease
burden in southeast Asia and posing a serious
impediment to public health and economic prosperity
in the region.47

Panel 2: Emergence of highly pathogenic avian
inﬂuenza A H5N1
Although smallholder herds and ﬂocks remain important for
the livelihoods and food security of millions of people,
intensiﬁcation of livestock production is rapidly occurring
worldwide. This process has inherent advantages in terms of
increased productivity, economies of scale, ease and
eﬃciency of surveillance, and application of herd health.
However, ecological risks of intensiﬁed production
(eg, increased host density and contact rates, reduction of
genetic diversity within populations, and selection of
genetic stock for improved feed conversion rather than
disease resistance) without eﬀective disease-control
practices, were shown by the emergence of highly
pathogenic avian inﬂuenza A H5N1. This form of avian
inﬂuenza evolved from a less virulent strain in domestic
poultry to become very virulent, probably as a result of
increased mixing between ﬂocks and species in an
environment where biosecurity improvements have not
kept pace with the rate of livestock intensiﬁcation.44 The
organism expanded its geographical range through various
movement and marketing practices, contamination of
inanimate objects and environments, and in some cases
transmission back to migratory birds.44 More than 579 cases
of H5N1 inﬂuenza in people have been reported globally,
resulting in 341 deaths, and more than 230 million birds
have been killed by the disease or culled in counter-epizootic
measures. However, the virus continues to circulate in avian
populations. More eﬀective control of this disease in
poultry, such as improved surveillance, prevention, and
response programmes, could have prevented cases of
disease in people and protected livelihoods.
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Land-use change, extractive industries, and
zoonoses
Many zoonoses can be linked to large-scale changes in
land use that aﬀect biodiversity and relations between
animal hosts, people, and pathogens. Land modiﬁcation,
irrespective of reason, changes vegetation patterns,
vector and host species dynamics (eg, abundance,
distribution, and demographics), microclimates, and
human contact with domestic and wild animals. All
these factors are crucial in disease ecology. The eﬀects
have been well studied and described for vector-borne
diseases such as malaria and Lyme disease.48 In
northeastern USA, a historical cycle of deforestation,
reforestation, and habitat fragmentation changed
predator–prey populations and led to the emergence of
Lyme disease.24 Prevalence of human alveolar echinococcosis (caused by Echinococcus multilocularis, a
tapeworm of wild and domestic canids, with small
mammals serving as intermediate hosts) in Tibet is
correlated with overgrazing and degradation of pastures
and the resulting increase in small mammal densities.49
In tropical regions, changes in land use have been
linked to the occurrence of Chagas disease,50 yellow
fever,51 and leishmaniasis.51 Such changes are particularly intense in tropical regions where primary
forest is opened up to mining, logging, plantation
development, and oil and gas extraction. This deforestation poses a threat to global health because many of
these regions are emerging disease hotspots—rich in
wildlife biodiversity and probably rich in the diversity
of microbes, many of which have not yet been
encountered by people.8 Increased access to tropical
forests for these extractive industries might increase
the risk of zoonotic disease by changing habitat and
vector community composition, modifying the distribution of wildlife populations and domestic animals,
and increasing exposure to pathogens through
increased human contact with animals.48,50
Human contact with wildlife is increased on a large
scale through road building, establishment of settlements, and increased mobility of people, and the
extractive process itself.51 Where these changes take
place, hunting, consumption, and trade in wildlife for
food often increases.4,52 If sites are poorly managed,
increased populations can strain existing infrastructure,
leading to overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, improper disposal of waste, and a lack of potable water.53
All of these changes increase the risk of cross-species
transmission of pathogens, resulting in zoonotic
disease. Additionally, new human inhabitants (recent
immigrants) might not have immunity to zoonotic
diseases endemic to the area, making them particularly
susceptible to infection.
Extractive industry companies often have to do assessments of the environmental and social eﬀect of their
processes. However, assessments of the health eﬀect
that include principles of disease ecology are rarely
1940

done because standard operating procedures in developing countries and speciﬁc laws or regulations often
do not require an assessment for health risks at a
community level.54 Furthermore, although some guidelines include zoonotic disease from domestic animals
in their intended scope, few adequately address the
range of potential zoonotic pathogens.

Antimicrobial drug resistance and zoonoses
Antimicrobial resistance is an important clinical
problem in veterinary and human medicine. Better
regulation of antimicrobial use in animals and more
judicious use by human beings is needed than exists at
present.55 Use of antibiotics is the most direct
mechanism for the evolution of antimicrobial-resistant
infectious diseases in people. However, because many
organisms carried by livestock are zoonotic and the
transmission of drug-resistant genetic material between
bacterial populations by phages can occur by other
means, the widespread use of antimicrobial drugs for
prophylaxis and as growth promoters in livestock
production has led to worries about a possible route for
the emergence of antibiotic resistance in people.56
From an ecological perspective, antimicrobial resistance is a natural occurrence; genes conferring resistance probably originated as an evolutionary response
to antimicrobial drugs produced by free-living bacteria,
fungi, and plants to protect themselves from infection
or competition (panel 3).63,64 The early antibiotics used
in human medicine were all derived from natural
bacterial and fungal sources. In turn, the use of these
compounds would have resulted in selection for
resistance in bacteria, and horizontal transfer via
transposons and plasmids allowed these genes to
spread rapidly through microbial populations and
communities. Resistance is emerging today on the
same evolutionary principles. Microbial populations
are adapting subject to the same forces of competition
and selection, but the current widespread use of
antimicrobial agents in people far exceeds that of any
time since their development as drugs.
Increased intensiﬁcation of livestock production
during the 20th century led to problems with infectious
diseases that transmitted easily in dense host
populations. In response, agricultural industries introduced a range of antimicrobial drugs because of their
prophylactic qualities.65 Some of these antibiotics are
also used extensively in animal feed, to enhance growth
rates, improve feeding eﬃciency, and decrease waste
production of animals.66 Whether or not the use of
antibiotics in agriculture has exacerbated drug resistance in people has been debated widely.67 Farmworkers
exposed occupationally to antibiotics have an increased
prevalence of resistant gut bacteria, and resistant pathogens of relevance to human medicine—including
meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus—have been
identiﬁed in farm animals, although the transfer of
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012
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these bacteria from people to farm animals is also a
plausible explanation.56,68 Several pathways exist
through which antimicrobial-resistant zoonotic pathogens could be transmitted from livestock to people,
including through food consumption, direct contact
with treated animals, waste management, use of
manure as fertiliser, faecal contamination of run-oﬀ,
movement of fomites through water and wind, and
translocation or migration of animals.63,69,70 Moreover,
30–90% of veterinary antibiotics are excreted after
administration to livestock, mostly in unmetabolised
form, presenting a direct route for environmental
contamination.56,69
Although known to occur, the extent of transfer of
antimicrobial-resistant organisms from animals to
people is unclear.56 Reduction of the use of antimicrobial
drugs in animals might not be a complete solution,
because diversity in antimicrobial resistance in people
is unlikely to be always related to geographical overlap
with livestock.71 Furthermore, the potential for reversal
of resistance is unknown, as is whether it would occur
in clinical settings after a change in antimicrobial use.
Substantial reductions in levels of resistant strains have
been shown after termination of drug use,67 although
persistence has been noted.72 Thus, reversion to drug
susceptibility probably depends on occurrence of
natural dilution of microbial populations with
susceptible strains and ﬁtness costs of resistance.72

Perspectives
The continuing eﬀect of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a
reminder of the risk of zoonotic pathogens spreading
from their natural reservoirs to man. What is far less
broadly appreciated is that none of the approaches
commonly used to search for potential new human
pathogens—such as tracing back the source host of a
human disease—probably would have identiﬁed
simian immunodeﬁciency virus as a potential risk to
man. Thus, bold new approaches are needed.73
According to estimates from the UN, the global population will be more than 9 billion by 2050, and more
than half the global population already lives in urban
areas. Changes to food production systems provide
more food security for growing populations, but also
change zoonotic disease risks in ways that challenge
disease control. The eﬀect of endemic zoonotic diseases
results in an annually recurring burden to the health
and livelihoods of people worldwide, but disproportionately burdens low-income and middle-income
countries.2,5 Costs of zoonotic diseases are not restricted
to expenses of human or animal treatment and control
eﬀorts. The disruptions to commerce and society
caused by disease outbreaks can account for a large
share (and in some cases almost all) of the economic
costs from disease. For example, SARS cost an
estimated $30–50 billion despite causing illness in
fewer than 9000 people.9
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012

Panel 3: Ecology of antimicrobial resistance
Antimicrobial-resistant bacteria occur in many wild mammals
and birds in numerous geographical locations.57–59 Although
such bacteria are expected to exist wherever they are exposed
to antimicrobials naturally produced by bacteria, fungi, or
plants, resistance noted in wildlife can also be a result of either
transmission of resistant organisms from domestic animals or
people, or anthropogenic contamination of the environment
with antimicrobials or their metabolites. Analysis of genes
conferring antimicrobial resistance from bacteria found in
non-human primates, people, and livestock shows that
resistant bacteria from non-human primates that live close to
people and livestock are genetically more similar than are
bacteria found in non-human primates from areas with little or
no geographical overlap with people and livestock.60 The study
also shows the natural occurrence of antimicrobial-resistant
organisms and similarities in resistance patterns where wildlife,
livestock, and people are in contact.
Studies of antimicrobial resistance in faecal Escherichia coli
from rodents on pig and poultry farms in the UK suggested
that resistance patterns, and the genes encoding resistance,
are much the same in both wildlife and livestock (Bennett M,
unpublished). Another study showed diﬀerent patterns of
resistance in E coli in bank voles (Myodes glareolus), wood mice
(Apodemus sylvaticus), and cattle on dairy farms in the UK.61
Moreover, prevalence of vancomycin resistance in E coli
between these two rodent species changes throughout the
year.61,62 This ﬁnding suggests that, whatever the original
sources of resistant bacteria and genes, diﬀerences in the
ecology of wildlife species (eg, their diet and physiology)
produce selection pressure on the microbes, rather than
diﬀerential exposure to anthropogenic antimicrobials or
presence of diﬀerent resistant strains in the environment.
The dynamics of antimicrobial resistance in wildlife, both
naturally occurring and arising from anthropogenic
inﬂuences, are not well established. Long-term multicentre
studies could provide an improved understanding of natural
variation, changes with time, and interspecies transfer. In
addition to observational studies, experimental work with
wildlife could provide valuable insights to understanding of
population and community eﬀects of antimicrobial use and
persistence of changes.

Understanding the ecology of zoonotic diseases at
the human being–animal interface is a complex
challenge. It requires knowledge of animal and human
medicine, ecology, sociology, microbial ecology, and
evolution, and the underlying issues that drive
increased transmission of pathogens in humans,
wildlife, and livestock: an idea described as a One
Health perspective.13,40 Meeting the challenge will also
require an understanding of how the environment is
changing, and how these changes aﬀect microbial
dynamics across the system. Therefore, prevention and
1941
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response to zoonotic diseases and elimination or
mitigation of transmission routes to prevent their
emergence will need multisectoral collaboration.5,40
Because zoonoses aﬀect developed and developing
countries alike, and spread readily across national
boundaries, mitigation and control needs collaboration
between ministries of health, environment and agriculture, and intergovernmental agencies involved in
health, trade, food production, and the environment.
International disease-prevention eﬀorts will be
enhanced by the implementation of WHO’s
International Health Regulations, which allow for
reporting of a broad range of human disease events,
1942

and through support of implementation of international
standards for animal health and zoonoses produced by
the World Organization for Animal Health, which
includes reporting obligations for animal diseases
including zoonoses. The need for improved veterinary
services in many low-income and middle-income
countries is implied by the gap in broad awareness of
zoonotic diseases and their ability for detection and
prevention in animals, and the ability to quantify and
report their occurrences. Because disruptive eﬀects to
commerce and society can account for a large share of
the economic costs of disease, integration of control
strategies in animals into zoonotic disease control
eﬀorts might prove more cost eﬀective than would
control in people alone.74
Recent advances in understanding of patterns of zoonotic disease emergence and spread have begun to be
integrated into human infectious-disease-control programmes, although substantial progress needs to be
made.75 Enhancing the role ecologists play in control
programmes could include production of more accurate
mathematical model outputs by collaboration with
clinicians with real-time data, participation in both
prospective and retrospective study design, and ﬁeld
studies to identify key risk factors to target surveillance
and interventions.7 Collaboration between public health
scientists, who normally use epidemiological techniques with human case data, and disease ecologists
who often work with wildlife or livestock data to model
risk in human beings, should be encouraged. These
disease ecology approaches might be particularly useful
in driving advances in prediction of the emergence and
spread of novel zoonoses.73 Understanding of the relation between environmental changes, wildlife population dynamics, and the dynamics of their microbes
can be used to forecast risk of human infection with
enzootic or endemic zoonoses (ﬁgure). All zoonoses
have non-human reservoir hosts, and the dynamics
of the pathogen in these hosts often determines the risk
of outbreaks in people. This risk can vary with geography, seasons, or through multiyear cycles, and can
depend on factors such as changes in land use, weather,
climate, or environment. Investigations into the
dynamics of zoonotic pathogens in their wildlife reservoir could act as an early warning system to better
inform the risk of an outbreak in livestock or people,
and reduce the number of cases of human disease. For
example, satellite tracking of vegetation density correlates with breeding sites for the vector of Rift Valley
fever, and has been used to successfully forecast cases of
disease in human beings, and the necessity for vaccine
supply.76 These approaches can be developed further to
ultimately predict the risk of future disease emergence.73
Study of the ecological, evolutionary, social, economic,
and epidemiological mechanisms that facilitate the
persistence of common endemic zoonoses and those
that drive zoonotic disease emergence in people has
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012
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intrinsic value. Although studies of common endemic
zoonoses are often underfunded and regarded as neglected tropical diseases, studies of zoonotic disease
emergence are challenged because they are often
intensive, retrospective, and sometimes expensive
(eg, studies to understand the cause of Nipah virus
emergence or wildlife reservoirs of Ebola virus). Furthermore, emerging zoonotic disease studies are often
considered as animal-focused or academic research
(eg, studies to understand how dynamics of a pathogen
in a wildlife host can change seasonally), when they are
actually translational research eﬀorts essential to guide
clinical or public health interventions (eg, seasonal variation in dynamics drives variation in risk to people).
The complex ecology of antimicrobial resistance and
foodborne zoonoses suggests new avenues for research,
including an understanding of the microbiome from
people and that of the animals they contact, and what
causes zoonotic microbes to proliferate in some
conditions. Eﬀects of the use of antibiotics in animal
production are not well understood, and the translation
of this science could be enhanced by involvement of
physicians, veterinarians, and ecologists in the design
and interpretation of studies. Standardised data collection and long-term monitoring are needed, as are
risk assessments for development of multidrug resistance or multibacterial infections in human beings
resulting from antimicrobial use in food animals and
from wildlife.63,67,69 Exploration of alternatives such as
probiotics, diets to promote healthy or protective gastrointestinal ﬂora, new methods of immune-system modulation, bacteriophages, bacterial cell wall hydrolases,
and antimicrobial peptides is warranted to help reduce
the need for antimicrobial use in people and animals.56,77
Industries based on the extraction of natural resources
provide materials and economic incentives, but might
lead to the release of pathogens that are new to human
hosts. Guidelines for safe or best practices that include
ecological knowledge to reduce the risk of disease
emergence or occurrence are urgently needed. Such
guidelines ought to be mandated through the funding
mechanisms that support large-scale development
projects or be required by ﬁnancial insurers.
Wide gaps in public health, veterinary and medical
infrastructure, and training exist between developed
and developing countries. These gaps aﬀect disease
prevention, surveillance, and control. Furthermore,
little integration of ecological approaches in zoonotic
disease prevention and control eﬀorts has occurred in
most countries. These challenges need to be addressed
urgently, and the One Health approach perhaps
provides a wider, holistic view with which to achieve
this aim. Although the causes and risks of zoonoses
vary widely from one region or culture to the next, our
global connectivity demands the attention and alertness
of health professionals everywhere. That human
activities are a driving force for where and how
www.thelancet.com Vol 380 December 1, 2012

zoonoses occur not only means that improved healthcare systems are needed, but also that multisectoral,
policy-level approaches should be instigated to decrease
the burden of endemic zoonoses and prevent emergence of new ones.
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